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Abstract
We address the question of how a third-party payer (e.g. an insurer) de-
cides what providers to contract with. Two different mechanisms are stud-
ied and their properties compared. A first mechanism consists in the third-
party payer setting up a bargaining procedure with both providers. The sec-
ond mechanism is the so-called “any willing provider” where the third-party
payer announces a contract and every provider freely decides to sign it or
not. The main finding is that the decision of the third-party payer depends
on the surplus to be shared. When it is relatively high the third-party payer
prefers the any willing provider system. When, on the contrary, the surplus
is relatively low, the third-party payer will select a negotiated solution.
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1 Introduction.
A major change in the health care sector worldwide appears in the contractual ar-
rangements between payers and providers of care. Countries with provision of
health care organized around explicit contracts, like the U.S., moved from retro-
spective to more prospective payment systems. Preferential provider arrangements
have also been introduced. Countries with a delivery of health care based on Na-
tional Health Systems seek to introduce some sort of explicit contracting. Again,
the definition of a contract implies specification of which organizations enter the
contract. Frech (1991) provides an overall account of the elements involved in
the design of doctors’ fees (see also Charatan (2000)). Moreover, Brooks et al.
(1997) documents empirically the importance of bargaining and the evolution of
the bargaining position between a third-party payer and a hospital in the case of
appendectomy pricing.
An alternative procedure is for the third-party payer to follow an “any willing
provider” approach: it announces price and conditions, and any provider that finds
them acceptable is allowed to join the network. The empirical relevance of this
approach is clear. In the US, “any willing provider” laws have recently been the
object of intense debate (and of a Supreme Court decision).1 Such laws force
managed care firms to take into their networks of providers all those willing to
accept the terms and conditions of the contract (price, quality and licensing). In
the economics literature, we find a couple of relevant studies. Vita (2001) focus
on the impact of selective contracting upon costs. More precisely, the effect of
any-willing-provider laws ensuring that no selective contracting takes place. The
starting point of the empirical test is the hypothesis that “any willing provider”
laws increase costs because they reduce the set of available instruments to payers
against the alternative that selective contracting creates inefficient risk selection.
The inefficient risk selection leads to higher aggregate costs as some people left
out will drive cost up by taking the fee-for-service regime. Vita’s findings give
more support to the first hypothesis than to the second. These results have not been
1See 〈 http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/02pdf/00-1471.pdf〉.
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confirmed by subsequent research. Carroll and Ambrose (2002) report no impact
on profitability from “any willing provider” laws. More recently, Morrisey and
Oshfeldt (2004) re-examine the issue, including also in the analysis “freedom of
choice” laws (which forces managed care firms to pay a fraction of the cost even
if patients use a provider of their choice which is outside the selected network of
the health plan). They look at market share of health maintenance organizations in
markets under different intensity of “any willing provider” laws, finding a negative
effect, though smaller in magnitude than “freedom of choice” laws.
In this paper, we address the question of how a third-party payer decides what
type of procedure to follow in contracting with providers. We insert this paper in a
more general research project analyzing the relationship between third-party pay-
ers and providers in the health care market. The interest of this research line lies
in the study of mechanisms combining health care insurance contract in a differ-
entiated product setting aiming at the control of the expenditure in the health care
sector. We can think of that relationship as the outcome of a three-stage game. In
a first stage, the third-party payer (be it a NHS or private insurance companies) of-
fers health insurance contracts to consumers. Such contracts specify the insurance
premium, the providers the individuals have access to when ill, and the associated
copayments. In a second stage, each insurance company defines the set of selected
providers to which the individuals that have contracted a health insurance have ac-
cess to when ill. Finally, in the third stage of the game, providers compete in prices
and qualities in the market. The competitive process among providers is influenced
by the selection decision of providers by the insurance companies to provide health
care services to their population of insured individuals. This order of moves is the
more natural one for health systems where the third-party payer has a very strong
commitment to provide health care in case of need or when third-party payers and
providers are able to renegotiate terms and conditions after insurance contracts
have been signed with consumers.2 We tackle the third stage of the game in Barros
2Of course, it may be the case that in certain circumstances a different timing assumption is
needed. For example, there are states in the US where insurers have to show evidence that providers
are willing to accept the insurance plan within a given geographic region prior to marketing the plan.
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and Martinez-Giralt (2002). There, we study the competitive effects on providers
from different reimbursement rules.
The present paper looks at the second stage of the game, that is, we analyze
how an insurance company decides the selection of providers to which the individ-
uals contracting a health care insurance will have access to. To make the problem
tractable, we consider one third-party payer and two providers. We take the per-
spective of a third-party payer that at the beginning of its activity has a set of
providers to choose among. The decision of the third-party payer consists in deter-
mining the price at which to reimburse the health care services offered to patients
insured with the company. We look at this problem from two different angles.
The third-party payer may bargain the reimbursement policy with each provider,
or may decide an “any willing provider” policy. In this case, health plans accept
any health care provider who agrees to conform to the plan’s conditions, terms and
reimbursement rates. The question we address is which of these procedures should
a third-party payer select.
The comparison between the bargaining protocol with the “any willing provider”
mechanism hinges upon the size of the surplus to be shared. Given that the “any
willing provider” mechanism represents a commitment to be tough, the larger the
surplus, the more valuable this commitment is.
This paper relaters with the works by Davidson (1988) and Gal-Or (1997,
1999). Davidson looks at a model of wage determination where two firms bar-
gain either with (i) the unions representing their respective workers, or (ii) a single
union representing all workers. This latter scenario corresponds to our bargain-
ing setting between the third-party payer and the providers. Davidson aims at
investigating the impact of the bargaining structure on wage determination. Our
interest differs in two aspects. On the one hand, the consequences of the failure
of the negotiation with one firm/provider, is to leave the rival firm as a monopolist
in Davidson’s model, while in for us, it implies that consumers patronizing that
If there is no renegotiation of prices after consumers sign insurance contracts, a different timeline of
decisions would result. We see our timing assumptions as describing most situations. We thank an
anonymous referee for calling our attention to this point.
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provider must bear the full cost of the service. On the other hand, the aim of our
paper is to provide rationale to the “any willing provider” mechanism. Davidson’s
scenario (i) represents an extension of our paper where several (two) payers ne-
gotiate with providers. This multipayer set-up is also used by Gal-Or (1997) to
study the way third-party payers select providers to contract with. She considers
two differentiated providers and finds that when consumers’ valuation of accessing
a full set of providers is small (large) relative to the degree of differentiation be-
tween payers, both payers choose to contract with only one of the (both) providers.
Also Gal-Or (1999) addresses the related issue of whether and how the formation
of vertical coalitions between physicians and hospital enhances their bargaining
power. It is also worth mentioning the work of Glazer and McGuire (2002), who
analyze the interaction between a public payer (contracting on a AWP basis), a
private one (selecting providers and adjusting prices according to quality), and a
provider. This is a problem complementary to ours, as we consider only one payer
and two providers, and no quality choice.
There are other possible mechanisms of interest. Among them, we can point
out at sequential bargaining so that after the third-party payer has finished the pro-
cedure with one provider, it starts a new one with the second provider. Conducting
sequential negotiations may nevertheless increase considerably transaction costs.
The implications of sequential bargaining are left for future research.
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 lays down the model
structure. In section 3 we report the equilibrium solution under bargaining, and
describe the equilibrium characterization associated with “any willing provider”
contracts. Next, section 4 discusses the optimal negotiation format. Section 5
concludes.
2 The model.
Assume there is population of consumers with a potential health problem. Each
member of the population has a given probability of being sick. The expected
mass of consumers demanding health care is 1 and it is distributed uniformly on a
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[0, 1] horizontal differentiation line. The location of the consumer in the horizontal
differentiation characteristic is independent of the probability of occurrence of the
illness episode. In terms of insurance choice models, this adds a background risk to
the demand for insurance, thus reinforcing the demand for insurance (Eeckhoudt
and Kimball, 1992). The population we study is made of patients and it is con-
ceivably, a subset of all people insured. In the first-stage of the game, individuals
face several possible states of the world (for example, healthy or sick). The uncer-
tainty faced at that stage determines health insurance demand. After realization of
uncertainty, if an individual is sick, demands one unit health care. The horizontal
differentiation line represents the differences providers have at consumers eyes. It
can be objective, like geographic distance, or subjective, such as personal taste for
one provider over the other 3. Providers are located at the extremes of the interval.
Whenever a patient cannot patronize his(her) best preferred provider, (s)he suffers
a loss in utility (or under the geographical interpretation, has to bear a transport
cost). We assume the patients’ utility loss increases at a constant rate t per unit of
utility.
We also assume that consumers are subject to compulsory health insurance.
Even in the presence of operating costs (recovered by insurance companies through
a loading factor) and/or not all providers being included in the insurance plan, we
take the consumer to contract full insurance. The assumption is made for simplic-
ity and, again, does not change the qualitative features of the model. We can see it
as a result of the insurance company offering only full insurance. To justify some-
what the assumption, we also consider that a consumer when signing the insurance
contract does not know beforehand the position (s)he will have in the horizontal
differentiation line when sick. This implies that when both providers are success-
ful in reaching an agreement, consumers can patronize either of them only bearing
the disutility cost. In case of disagreement with one provider, consumers have the
choice of patronizing the in-plan provider at zero cost or the out-of-plan provider
3Implicitly, we assume that there are no quality differences across providers. Otherwise, a ver-
tical differentiation dimension would have to be added to the problem. For quality issues in the
provision of health care in the context of vertical differentiation models see Jofre-Bonet (2000) and
the references therein.
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at full cost. If no provider reaches an agreement with the insurer, it gives back the
premia to consumers and providers compete a` la Bertrand in the market.
The insurance contract defines a premium to be paid by consumers, which
is taken as given at the moment of contracting with providers. When selecting
providers, the third-party payer (in line with the complete three-stage game de-
scribed above) has already collected the insurance premia/contributions from con-
sumers. Thus, total revenues of the insurance company are exogenously given.
We restrict attention to equilibrium situations where the third-party payer con-
tracts with at least one provider. The case of not contracting with any provider
means that no insurance is, in fact, given. It cannot be an equilibrium contract of
the full, three-stage, game. We ignore it in the ensuing analysis. We also assume,
for simplicity, zero production costs in the provision of health care. Our qualitative
results are insensitive to this simplifying assumption.
As mentioned above, two mechanisms of price formation will be studied. A
way of contracting health care services frequently used by Governments and, to
some extent, by private health plans or insurance companies involves the payer
announcing a price, and providers deciding, on a volunteer basis, to join (or not)
the agreement. This is known as “any willing provider” (AWP) contracts. Simon
(1995) studies both the characteristics of the states that have enacted AWP laws
and their effect on managed care penetration rates and provider participation. Also,
Ohsfeldt et al. (1998) explore the growth of AWP laws applicable to managed care
firms and the determinants of their enactment4.
Alternatively, the third-party payer may negotiate with the providers. We pro-
pose the Nash Bargaining solution as the equilibrium concept. The Nash bargain-
ing solution yields outcomes that satisfy a set of four conditions (axioms). These
axioms have been interpreted as the guiding principles that an arbitrator would
4Within this framework, providers may be, or not, allowed to balance bill patients, that is, they
may charge, or not, an amount to consumers on top of the price received by the third-party payer.
Balance billing has received some attention in the literature. See Glazer and McGuire (1993), Zuck-
erman and Holahan (1991) and Hixson (1991). Since balance billing in not crucial to our arguments,
we assume it away. This assumption is also supported by its prohibition in several countries.
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follow to solve a situation of conflict.5 The solution was shown to maximize the
product of each bargainer gains over the fallback position. The notion of bargain-
ing power is embodied in the parameter δ. The Nash bargaining model can be
linked to alternating offers models, thus providing some justification to bargaining
power.
The alternating offers model sets the bargaining process as a sequence of offers
and counteroffers. This allows for an explicit treatment of bargaining as a time
consuming activity and of time preferences of bargainers. Typically, alternating
offers models are able to establish a relationship between bargaining power in the
Nash bargaining model and the discount rates of agents, costs of delay, and the
period of time between offers.6 In our case, it would involve the same degree of
arbitrary judgement to endow the third-party payer and health care providers with
distinct time-preference rates or to directly set their bargaining power parameter
in the Nash bargaining solution. For simplicity, we have decided for the latter
modeling option.
In our setting, the conflict appears because the insurer’s cost represents the
providers’ revenues. Naturally, the outcome of the negotiation hinges on the pa-
rameters of the bargaining problem. These are the distribution of bargaining power
among the players and the so-called “status-quo“, or the fallback values. That
is, the outcome that would arise should the negotiation fail. We assume that
providers do not collude, that is negotiations are carried simultaneously with the
two providers who decide their actions in a non-cooperative way. The issue of
collusion among providers is tackled in a companion paper Barros and Martinez-
Giralt (2004).
There is a difference to existing literature that is worth noting. Fallback values
in one negotiation in our setting, depend on the outcome of the other negotia-
tion. This happens because providers after each negotiation compete in the market.
Thus, the outcome of each negotiation is conditional on the expected price of the
5The axioms are: invariance to equivalent utility representations, symmetry, independence of
irrelevant alternatives and Pareto efficiency. See Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, pp. 11-13).
6For a textbook treatment of the alternating offers model and its relation with the Nash bargaining
solution, the interested reader can consult Muthoo (1999, ch.3).
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other provider. we force expectations to hold in equilibrium.
A detailed analysis of all these elements is beyond the scope of the present
paper. Extensive presentations of bargaining theory are Binmore et al. (1986), Os-
borne and Rubinstein (1990) or Roth (1985). Also, a short introduction is provided
by Sutton (1986).
Generically, providers may have different bargaining powers, so that the dis-
tribution of bargaining power will involve a parameter constellation for the third-
party payer and the two providers respectively. However, we are interested in com-
paring different systems of negotiation between a third-party payer and a set of
providers. To keep focus in this issue we will assume that all providers have the
same bargaining power, so that they will be symmetric in all respects. We could
think of asymmetries in bargaining power as a way to capture differences in tech-
nology, size, quality, etc. among providers. In turn, this would imply that we would
have to allow providers to react to the differential characteristic (e.g. invest in size,
R& D, quality, etc.) introducing an additional stage in the game. In our perception
this implied modeling would add little to the determination of prices. We discuss
the implications of this assumption at the end of the paper.
3 Equilibrium analysis.
3.1 “Any willing provider” contracts.
“Any willing provider” contracts have the third-party payer announcing a price p,
and leaving to the providers the option of joining, or not, the agreement7. In a world
of two providers, the set of possible decisions defines four different sub-games in
prices, which in turn define previous-stage profits for providers. Therefore, we first
characterize the four subgames. When both providers choose to join the agreement,
demand is split in half. Each provider receives price p. Profits earned are Πi =
p/2, i = A,B. In the other polar case of both providers choosing not to join the
agreement, the market game is back to the Hotelling price game. As mentioned
7Although in reality AWP contracts also include conditions on dimensions other than price, here
we concentrate on the price aspect to be able to compare the outcome of AWP contracts with the
corresponding outcome of the negotiation procedure.
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before, equilibrium profits are Πi = t/2, i = A,B.
The last possible case has one provider joining the agreement and accepting
to receive p, while the other stays out and sets freely its price. Without loss of
generality, we assume provider A to join the agreement. Demand is defined by the
location of the indifferent consumer, which is given by:
tx = pB + t(1− x) or x = 12 +
pB
2t
.
Since providers are not allowed to balance bill patients, someone visiting provider
A pays nothing while if he visits provider B pays the full price charged by the lat-
ter provider. The equilibrium price of provider B is pB = t/2 and profits are
ΠB = t/8 and ΠA = 3p/4.
The payoff matrix of the first-stage of the subgame is now given by Table 1.
A/B Join Not Join
Join p/2 ; p/2 3p/4 ; t/8
Not Join t/8 ; 3p/4 t/2 ; t/2
Table 1: AWP equilibrium profits.
For the outcome of both providers joining to be an equilibrium, it is necessary
and sufficient that
p
2
≥ t
8
or
p
t
≥ 1
4
.
On the other hand, for both providers to stay out of the agreement, we need
to have p/t < 2/3. It is straightforward to check that there is no asymmetric
equilibrium in pure strategies. The different possibilities can be traced in the (p, t)
space as shown in Figure 1. Although this may appear natural given the symmetry
of players, a` priori one could not rule out that asymmetric equilibria may result
from an ex-ante symmetric market structure.8
It is clear that there is a range of parameter values for which both equilibria
may arise. We use Pareto dominance (from the providers’ viewpoint) as selection
8Most textbooks of game theory provide 2 × 2 games of symmetric agents where only asym-
metric equilibria exist. More structured market situations, like vertical differentiation, also result in
asymmetric equilibria with ex-ante identical firms.
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Figure 1: AWP equilibrium regimes.
criterion, which ensures that only one equilibrium is selected. Thus, the equilib-
rium where both providers join the agreement occurs for p/t ≥ 2/3, as in the
intermediate range it is dominated by the other equilibrium candidate.
We take now the optimal choice of the price set by the third-party payer. The
criterion is the minimization of total health expenditure. Given the initial assump-
tion of full insurance, all expenses will be paid, irrespective of the provider chosen
by each particular consumer. The optimal value of p to be announced in the “any
willing provider” contract is the lower price that still allows for both providers ac-
cepting it. Thus, the optimal price is p/t = 2/3. This optimal price is also lower
than t, which guarantees that the third-party payer prefers to announce “any willing
provider” contracts instead of allowing free competition between the parties (and
having to reimburse consumers from the care they would seek in a pure private
market equilibrium).
Note that the payer needs to announce a fee sufficiently high to induce partici-
pation of at least one provider. But in equilibrium with both providers participating
the fee is lower than what the take-it or leave-it offer would have been. In other
words, the payer is willing to give away some monopoly (bargaining) power in
order to induce an equilibrium with providers’ participation. Thus, softening the
(full) bargaining power that too a rigid payer would reflect in committing to a high
11
fee.
One could think of alternative ways to model fee schedules, such as a two-part
tariff where the variable part could be linked to the market share of the provider.
As we are only dealing with price schemes, appealing to real market situations, this
type of schemes are beyond the scope of this paper. Alternatively, the payer could
propose a price scheme conditional on the number of participants. In particular, a
price,
p =
{
2t/3 if one provider participates
t/4 if two providers participate
would yield a unique equilibrium p = t/4 with both providers joining the agree-
ment. However, AWP regulation does not allow for discrimination among partici-
pants. Also, in our setting of perfect information, the equilibrium price should be
renegotiation-proof, so fees are not to be expected to be adjusted once providers
have agreed to the price.
3.2 Bargaining.
By bargaining we refer to the situation where the third-party payer carries negoti-
ations simultaneously but independently with the providers. The third-party payer
has a bargaining power strength parameter given by δ and each provider is endowed
with 1 − δ. Note that this situation does not correspond to a process where after
failing to close a deal with one provider, the third-party payer addresses the second
one. In our scenario, the provider when accepting or rejecting a deal does not know
the outcome of the other parallel negotiation process.
Three scenarios may appear. Both providers successfully close the negotia-
tion with the third-party payer, none does, or only one is successful. We start by
introducing some notation. Let R be the (exogenous) premia collected by the third-
party payer. F denotes the penalty to the third-party payer when one provider does
not accept. This penalty is left unspecified at this stage. It captures the point that
an insurer giving access to a smaller set of options in health care provision faces a
cost to it (for example reputation, value of variety and freedom of choice to con-
sumers, or money returned to insured people). Π̂ are third-party payer’s profits;
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Πi are profits to provider i when both negotiations are successful; Π˜i are profits
to provider i when its negotiation succeeds while j’s does not, Πi are profits to
provider i when its negotiation fails while j’s is successful. Finally, Πi are profits
to provider i when both negotiations fail. Table 2 summarizes these alternatives.
i  j Success Fail
Success Πi,Πj Π˜i,Πj
Fail Πi, Π˜j Πi,Πj
Table 2: Providers’ profits alternatives.
Given that we are assuming away production costs in the provision of health
care services, providers’ profits are simply the revenues from providing treatment
to those patients patronizing the respective facilities.
Profits obtained by the third-party payer when negotiations are successful with
both providers are given by R−ΠA−ΠB . When, say, only provider A reaches an
agreement, the revenues to the third-party payer are R − Π˜A − F . Finally, if no
negotiation succeeds, the third-party payer obtains zero revenues (as no insurance
is contracted). In this latter case the market game is just a Hotelling price game
with fixed locations. The symmetry of the solution implies equal demand to each
provider and prices are, in equilibrium, pi = t, i = A,B. Associated equilibrium
profits are Πi = t/2, i = A,B.
Two successful negotiations.
We deal first with the conditions to be satisfied such that both negotiations are
successful.
Given our assumption of full insurance, an equilibrium with both providers
accepting exists, given the symmetry between providers, when the same price pre-
vails for both. Hence, providers will share the market evenly and their profits will
be given by half of the respective equilibrium price since total demand is normal-
ized to the unit.
The negotiation with provider A is described by the following problem,
max
PA
[
(R−ΠA −ΠB)− (R− F − Π˜B)
]δ
(ΠA −ΠA)(1−δ).
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where PA and PB denote the fees for providers A and B respectively.
The fallback level of the third party payer is defined by the profits it obtains un-
der the agreement with the other provider, net of the penalty associated to a smaller
set of providers than the maximum possible. The fallback for the provider is given
by the profits available when the rival provider succeeds in his(her) negotiation.
This are profits when provider i is out-of-plan, so that those patients patronizing it
have to bear the full cost, while its rival is an in-plan provider. This implies that
the consumer indifferent between either provider is given by x(Pi) = 12 − Pi2t and
provider i’s profits are given by Πi(Pi) = Pix(Pi). Thus, the maximizer price is,
Pi = t2 , and profits Πi =
t
8 .
Similarly, the negotiation with provider B is given by,
max
PB
[
(R−ΠA −ΠB)− (R− F − Π˜A)
]δ
(ΠB −ΠB)(1−δ)
From the symmetry of providers, Π˜A = Π˜B = Π˜ and ΠA = ΠB = Π = t/8.
The first order conditions of the maximization problems yield,
Pi = 2(1− δ)(F + Π˜− 12Pj) +
δt
4
, i, j = A,B; i 6= j.
Solving the first order conditions and defining R˜ ≡ F + Π˜ we obtain the
(symmetric) prices:
P˜ =
2(1− δ)
2− δ R˜+
δt
4(2− δ) > 0.
Substituting the value of R˜,
R˜ = F + Π˜ = F + δ
t
2
+ (1− δ)(R− F )
we obtain,
P˜ =
2(1− δ)
2− δ
[
δt
2
+ (1− δ)R+ δF
]
+
δt
4(2− δ)
These (positive) prices are equilibrium prices if two additional consistency con-
ditions are met: (i) no provider wants to leave the agreement and (ii) the third-party
payer obtains non-negative revenues. Condition (i) requires Π(P˜ ) = P˜ /2 ≥ Πi =
t/8. This is satisfied iff R˜ > t/4. Condition (ii) is fulfilled iff R ≥ P˜ .
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One successful negotiation only.
Take now the case of only one provider accepting the price determined in the
negotiation process.
Assume that provider i accepts the deal while provider j rejects it. The negoti-
ation process between the third-party payer and provider i is described by,
max
Pi
(R− Π˜i − F )δ(Π˜i −Πi)1−δ.
The solution of this problem is given by,
Pi =
4
3
(δt
2
+ (1− δ)(R− F )
)
; Pj =
t
2
;
Π˜i =
δt
2
+ (1− δ)(R− F ); Πj = t8; and,
Π̂ =δ
(
R− F − t
2
)
.
The pair (Pi, Pj) will constitute an equilibrium price pair if (i) providers’ prices
and third-party revenues are non-negative and (ii) provider i is not willing to quit
the agreement (i.e. Π˜i ≥ Πi) and provider j does not want to join it (i.e. Πj ≥ Πj).
Third-party revenues are non-negative iff R− F ≥ t/2. This condition is also
sufficient to ensure that Pi ≥ 0 and that provider i does not have incentives to leave
the agreement. Provider j does not want to join iff R ≤ t/4.
Note that the latter condition is not compatible with the former, so that we
cannot have an equilibrium with only one provider successfully terminating the
negotiation with the third-party payer.
We can summarize the discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. It is not possible to find an equilibrium configuration where only
one provider reaches an agreement with the third-party payer.
Moreover, when R˜ ≥ t/4 and R ≥ P˜ , both negotiation processes are success-
ful and the equilibrium price is given by P˜ = 2(1− δ)
2− δ R˜+
δt
4(2− δ) .
This proposition implies that under explicit bargaining procedure with identical
providers it cannot be the case of only one successful negotiation. Again, in our
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framework, the symmetry of players does result in a symmetric equilibrium. The
disadvantage in terms of demand from being left out is higher than the advantage of
being a price-setter. Moreover, it is not clear that the equilibrium price is smaller
than the one prevailing on the stand-alone market (that is, without insurance to
consumers). The condition for a higher price under bargaining relative to the stand-
alone case is R˜ ≥ t/2, which is compatible with the conditions for existence of a
bargaining equilibrium.
4 The preferred negotiation format.
Note that the comparison between bargaining and AWP is only relevant for p ≥
2t/3 and also for R ≥ min{ t2 + F, 2t3 }. As shown previously, values of R above
t
2+F ensure non-negative profits to the payer under bargaining and also guarantees
participation by the providers; values of R under 2t/3 would yield negative surplus
to the payer under the AWP regime.
From the point of view of the third-party payer, the bargaining procedure is
better than “any willing provider” if
Π̂SB − Π̂AWP = p−
( δt
4(2− δ) + R˜
2(1− δ)
2− δ
)
> 0.
This condition defines a line, as shown in Figure 2, which allows for a simple
description of the basic economic intuition. The intuition runs as follows. If R˜
is small, there is not much surplus to bargain. Hence, prices will be below the
price required in the any willing provider case to generate the acceptance outcome.
The reverse occurs for high R˜. Since the bargaining process transfers surplus, the
any willing provider contract is equivalent to a “tough” bargaining position. The
commitment to a price is more valuable when R˜ is large.
A comment is in order here. We have seen that under bargaining given the
symmetry of the model both providers accept the same price. Why is it not the case
that under AWP announcing that price is not an equilibrium? Actually, under AWP
we have obtained that for any p ≥ t/4 both providers join. Also, we have shown
that there are two equilibria where both providers join and where no provider joins.
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Figure 2: Optimal negotiation procedure
Artificially, (since the Pareto criterion does not select among the two equilibria)
we are forcing p > 2t/3 to eliminate the equilibrium where no provider joins as
it cannot be an equilibrium of the full three-stage game. In other words, we are
imposing to the third-party payer a conservative behavior in the sense that we are
not allowing it to announce a price p ∈ (t/4, 2t/3) so that no provider would
decide to accept.
In our two-provider world, it is never the case that one provider decides to join
negotiations with the third-party payer, while the other provider remains outside
any agreement. One may question whether this a general feature. In particular, we
want to address whether this is a matter of a small number of providers, or not.
The basic intuition carries through to a world with mode providers9. A question of
interest is whether the increase in the number of providers does change the relative
attractiveness of bargaining vs. any willing provider contracts. Under reasonable
assumptions, an increase in the total number of providers makes less likely for
any willing provider contracts to dominate. This is so because the equilibrium
price under bargaining will be lower the higher the number of providers, while the
9An appendix available at 〈http://ppbarros.fe.unl.pt/papers.html〉, we show that there is no subset
of providers which choose, in equilibrium, not to negotiate prices with the third-party payer.
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optimal price under the any willing provider procedure is insensitive to the number
of providers (see the appendix for details).
5 Final remarks.
In this paper, we address a simple question: what negotiation procedure should a
third-party payer select when contracting health care providers? Two alternatives,
commonly observed, have been considered: bargaining and “any willing provider”
contracts.
The main finding of the analysis is that whenever the surplus to be shared in
the bargaining is relatively high, the third-party payer prefers the “any willing
provider” system. This is so because the simple price announcement constitutes an
implicit commitment to be tough. This commitment is more valuable in the case
of a bigger surplus.
Although most of the analysis has been done considering two providers only,
we can extend the same arguments to an arbitrary number of providers. Moreover,
under the symmetry assumptions used, the possible equilibria with an arbitrary
number of providers are characterized either all providers joining the agreement
with the third-party payer, or none accepting the proposal of the third-party payer.
Some caveats to the model deserve discussion. The first one is the symmetry
across providers. We conjecture that introducing asymmetries across providers,
be it in the bargaining power vis-a-vis the third-party payer, or in the production
costs of health care services, will not change the qualitative results, especially if
price discrimination by the third-party payer across providers is not feasible. This
seems to be, in general, the case. Payments to providers can differ according to
patient characteristics but not according to providers’ efficiency level. Of course,
some exceptions exist (for example, high reputation doctors may be able to obtain
a better value for consultation).
Second, we conjecture that the introduction of asymmetries would allow us to
obtain equilibria characterized by some providers being associated with the third-
party payer, while others remain independent. Once again, we believe the relative
18
advantages and costs of the different bargaining procedures to still be present.
The third issue is quality. We have assumed away quality considerations. Thus,
our analysis applies to the provision of services where quality can be easily moni-
tored, or does not have a major impact on patients’ selection of provider. Again, we
conjecture that the essential trade-off in choosing between “any willing provider”
contracts or an explicit bargaining procedure would remain. It would not change
our insight related to the incentives of the third-party payer to choose one of the
bargaining procedures proposed. This is left for future research.
The analysis renders some testable predictions. The simplest one to put to test
is that whenever a high surplus to be shared exists, one should be observe more
frequently “any willing provider” contracts. Another one is that the number of
providers should not have an impact on the selection of the bargaining procedure
as long as the surplus per patient treated is kept constant. If the per capita surplus
grows (decreases) with the number of providers in the market, then one should
observe “any willing provider” more (less) often. It is beyond the scope of the
paper to empirically test these implications. The empirical testing of the model is
left for future research.
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